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Abstract
We study the problem of fingerprint presentation attack
detection (PAD) under unknown PA materials not seen dur-
ing PAD training. A dataset of 5, 743 bonafide and 4, 912
PA images of 12 different materials is used to evaluate a
state-of-the-art PAD, namely Fingerprint Spoof Buster. We
utilize 3D t-SNE visualization and clustering of material
characteristics to identify a representative set of PA mate-
rials that cover most of PA feature space. We observe that
a set of six PA materials, namely Silicone, 2D Paper, Play
Doh, Gelatin, Latex Body Paint and Monster Liquid Latex
provide a good representative set that should be included in
training to achieve generalization of PAD. We also propose
an optimized Android app of Fingerprint Spoof Buster that
can run on a commodity smartphone (Xiaomi Redmi Note 4)
without a significant drop in PAD performance (from TDR
= 95.7% to 95.3% @ FDR = 0.2%) which can make a PA
prediction in less than 300ms.
1. Introduction
With the ubiquitous deployment of fingerprint recog-
nition for unlocking smartphones, authenticating financial
transactions, international border security, etc., they are now
a prime target for presentation attacks. The ISO standard
IEC 30107-1:2016(E) [17] defines presentation attacks as
the “Presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem
with the goal of interfering with the operation of the bio-
metric system”. One of the most common ways to realize
presentation attacks is using fingerprint spoofs1, i.e. gummy
fingers. Gummy fingers [25] refer to counterfeit finger-
like objects, fabricated using commonly available materi-
als such as latex, gelatin, wood glue, etc., with an accurate
imitation of another individual’s friction ridge patterns en-
graved on its surface. These can be prepared with a mul-
1Fingerprint spoofs are one of most commonly deployed presentation at-
tacks. Other forms include fingerprint alterations and cadaver fingers.
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Figure 1. Twelve different PA fabrication materials investigated in
this study.
titude of fabrication processes ranging from basic molding
and casting2 to utilizing sophisticated 2D and 3D printing
techniques [25, 12, 4, 8].
Fingerprint spoof attacks were reported to bypass the fin-
gerprint system security with a success rate of more than
70% [3]. For instance, in March 2013, a Brazilian doc-
tor was arrested for fooling the biometric attendance sys-
tem for colleagues at a hospital in Sao Paulo using silicone
spoof fingers3. In another incident, in Sept. 2013, Ger-
many’s Chaos Computer Club hacked the capacitive sensor
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bp-MrrAmprA
3http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-21756709
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Figure 2. An overview of the Fingerprint Spoof Buster [6], a state-of-the-art fingerprint PAD, utilizing CNNs trained on local patches
centered and aligned using minutiae location and orientation, respectively.
of recently released Apple iPhone 5s with inbuilt TouchID
fingerprint technology by utilizing a high resolution photo-
graph of the enrolled user’s fingerprint to fabricate a spoof
fingerprint with wood glue4. And more recently, in July
2016, Michigan State University researchers assisted police
in a homicide case by unlocking a fingerprint secure smart-
phone using a 2D printed fingerprint spoof5. Many such
attacks go unreported.
Given the growing possibilities for fingerprint PA at-
tacks, there is now an urgent requirement for presentation
attack detection as a first line of defense to ensure the secu-
rity of a fingerprint recognition system. In response to this,
a series of fingerprint Liveness Detection (LivDet) compe-
titions [12] have been held since 2009 to advance state-of-
the-art and benchmark the proposed PAD solutions, with
the latest edition held in 2017 [27]. Generally, presenta-
tion attacks can be detected by either: (i) hardware-based
approaches, i.e. augmenting the fingerprint readers with
sensor(s) to gather evidence of the liveness of the sub-
ject, or (ii) software-based approaches, i.e. extract fea-
tures from the presented fingerprint image (or a sequence
of frames) [27, 12, 21, 23]. In the case of hardware-based
approaches, special types of sensors are proposed to de-
tect the characteristics of vitality, such as blood flow [19],
skin distortion [1], odor [2], sub-dermal ridge patterns using
multispectral scanner [36, 34] or optical coherence tomog-
raphy (OCT) [15]. An open-source fingerprint reader, that
can be constructed using commodity hardware, utilizes a
two-camera design providing two complementary streams
of information for spoof detection [9, 10].
Software-based solutions, unlike hardware-based solu-
tions, work with any commodity fingerprint readers. The
various approaches in the literature have explored hand-
crafted features: (i) anatomical features (e.g. pore locations
4http://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-apple-touchid
5https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/07/28/fingerprint-
clone-hack-unlocks-murder-victim-samsung-s6-hacks-apple-iphone-
galaxy-s7/
and their distribution [24]), (ii) physiological features (e.g.
perspiration [22]), or (iii) texture-based features (e.g. Bina-
rized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [11] and Weber Lo-
cal Descriptor [13]). Gragniello et al. [14] utilized spatial
and frequency domain information to construct a 2D local
contrast-phase descriptor (LCPD) for PAD.
One of the limitations of the above mentioned PAD ap-
proaches is their poor generalization performance against
PA materials not seen during training [33]. Some stud-
ies have modeled PAD as an open-set problem. Rattani
et al. [33] utilized Weibull-calibrated SVM (W-SVM), a
SVM variant based on properties of statistical extreme
value theory, to detect PAs made of novel materials. Ding
and Ross [7] utilized textural features extracted from only
bonafide fingerprint images to train an ensemble of multiple
one-class SVMs.
New approaches to fingerprint PAD have proposed con-
volutional neural network (CNN) based solutions which
have been shown to outperform hand-crafted features on
publicly available LivDet databases [26, 28, 18, 5, 30, 36,
6]. But, there are two major limitations of the CNN based
approaches. (i) Generalization: the selection of PA materi-
als used in training (known PAs) directly impacts the per-
formance against unknown PAs. It is reported that some PA
materials are easier to detect (e.g. EcoFlex, Gelatin, Latex)
compared to others (e.g. Wood Glue, Silgum) when left out
from training [6]. (ii) High memory and computation re-
quirements: this inhibits their use in low resource environ-
ments such as smartphones or embedded devices (e.g. stan-
dalone smart fingerprint readers). Introduction of in-display
optical fingerprint technology6,7 would require efficient and
robust PAD solutions running on the devices.
To overcome the above two limitations, Chugh et al. [6]
proposed Fingerprint Spoof Buster utilizing local patches
(96 × 96) centered and aligned using fingerprint minutiae
to train a MobileNet-v1 model [16]. This fusion of fin-
6http://www.vivo.com/en/products/v11
7https://www.oneplus.com/6t
Table 1. Summary of the dataset and generalization performance
(TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%) with leave-one-out method. A total of
twelve models are trained where the material left-out from training
is taken as the new material for evaluating the model.
Fingerprint
Presentation
Attack Material
#Images #Local
Patches
Generalization
Performance (TDR
(%) @ FDR = 0.2%)
Silicone 1, 160 38, 145 67.62
Monster Liquid
Latex
882 27, 458 94.77
Play Doh 715 17, 602 58.42
2D Printed Paper 481 7, 381 55.44
Wood Glue 397 12, 681 86.38
Gold Fingers 295 9, 402 88.22
Gelatin 294 10, 508 54.95
Dragon Skin 285 7, 700 97.48
Latex Body Paint 176 6, 366 76.35
Transparency 137 3, 846 95.83
Conductive Ink on
Paper
50 2, 205 90.00
3D Universal
Targets
40 1, 085 95.00
Total PAs 4,912 144,379 Weighted
Total Bonafide 5,743 228,143 Average: 75.24
gerprint domain knowledge (minutiae) and local patches
around minutiae provides accuracy and generalization abil-
ity of Spoof Buster. We evaluate the performance of Fin-
gerprint Spoof Buster against unknown PAs by adopting a
leave-one-out protocol; one material is left out from train-
ing set and is then utilized for evaluating cross-material or
generalization performance. We utilize 3D t-SNE visual-
izations of the bonafide and PA samples in the CNN feature
space to investigate the relationship between different PA
materials and correlate it with their cross-material perfor-
mances and material characteristics to identify a representa-
tive set of materials that should be included during training
to enhance the generalization performance. We also opti-
mize Fingerprint Spoof Buster for implementation and real-
time inference in smartphones. The main contributions of
this paper are:
1. Evaluated the generalization performance of Finger-
print Spoof Buster, a state-of-the-art CNN-based PAD
approach using 12 different PA materials.
2. Used 3D t-SNE visualization and material characteris-
tics to identify a “representative set” of materials (Sil-
icone, 2D paper, Play Doh, Gelatin, Latex Body Paint,
and Monster Liquid Latex) that could almost cover the
entire PA feature space.
3. Optimized Fingerprint Spoof Buster by K-means clus-
tering of minutiae to reduce the number of local
patches. Approximately 4-fold savings in computation
is achieved while maintaining the PAD performance.
4. The optimized Android app, called Fingerprint Spoof
Buster Lite, is implemented using a quantized
MobileNet-v1 model. The app accepts a live-scan fin-
gerprint and makes a bonafide v. PA decision in 300
ms on a Xiaomi Redmi Note 4.
2. Proposed Approach
2.1. Fingerprint Spoof Buster
Fingerprint Spoof Buster [6], a state-of-the-art PAD ap-
proach, utilizes local patches (96×96) centered and aligned
around fingerprint minutiae. It is trained on a MobileNet-
v1 [16] CNN model to evaluate its generalization per-
formance. Figure 2 presents an overview of the Finger-
print Spoof Buster. It achieved the state-of-the-art perfor-
mance [6] on publicly available LivDet databases [12] and
exceeded the IARPA Odin Project [29] requirement of TDR
= 97.0% @ FDR = 0.2%.
2.2. Presentation Attack Database
We constructed a database of 5, 743 bonafide8 and 4, 912
PA images captured on CrossMatch Guardian 2009, one of
the most popular slap readers. This dataset is created by
combining the publicly available MSU Fingerprint Presen-
tation Attack Dataset (MSU-FPAD) and Precise Biometrics
Spoof-Kit Dataset (PBSKD) [6]. Table 1 lists the 12 PA
materials, the total number of impressions, and minutiae-
based local patches for each material type. Figure 1 shows
fingerprint spoof images fabricated using them.
2.3. Experimental Protocol
We adopt the leave-one-out protocol to simulate the sce-
nario of encountering unknown materials to evaluate the
generalization ability of Fingerprint Spoof Buster. One PA
material out of the 12 types is left out from the training set
which is then utilized during testing. This requires training
a total of 12 different MobileNet-v1 models each time leav-
ing out one of the 12 different PA types. The 5, 743 bonafide
images are partitioned into training and testing such that
there are 1, 000 randomly selected bonafide images in test-
ing set and the remaining 4, 743 images in training.
2.4. Performance against Unknown Materials
Table 1 presents the performance of Fingerprint Spoof
Buster against unknown presentation attacks in terms of
8In the literature, the term live fingerprint has been primarily used to refer
a bonafide fingerprint juxtaposed to spoof fingerprints. However, in the
context of all forms of presentation attacks, bonafide fingerprint is a more
appropriate term as some PAs such as fingerprint alterations also exhibit
characteristics of liveness.
9https://www.crossmatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/20160726-
DS-En-Guardian-200.pdf
Figure 3. Light absorbance property of twelve PA materials in 200nm - 800nm wavelength spectrum.
Figure 4. Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy of twelve PA materials in the 260 - 375 wavenumber range.
TDR @ FDR = 0.2%. The weighted average generaliza-
tion performance achieved by the PAD with leave-one-out
method is TDR = 75.24%, compared to TDR = 97.20% @
FDR = 0.2% when all PA material types are known during
training. The PA materials Dragon Skin, Monster Liquid
Latex, Transparency, 3D Universal Targets, and Conductive
Ink on Paper are easily detected with a TDR ≥ 90% @
FDR = 0.2% even when these materials are not seen by the
models during training. On the other hand, PA materials
such as PlayDoh, Gelatin, 2D Printed Paper, and Silicone
are the most affected by leave-one-out method achieving a
TDR ≤ 70% @ FDR = 0.2%. To understand the reasons
for this difference in performance for different materials,
we study the material characteristics in the next section.
2.5. PA Material Characteristics
Table 1 shows that some of the PA materials are eas-
ier to detect than others, even when left out from train-
ing. To understand the reason for this, it is crucial to iden-
tify the relationship between different PAs in terms of their
material characteristics. If we can group the PA materi-
als based on shared characteristics, it can be utilized to
identify a set of representative materials to train a robust
and generalized model. For the given dataset of fingerprint
images captured using CrossMatch Guardian 200 optical
reader, we measured the following material characteristics:
(i) Optical properties: Ultra Violet - Visible (UV-Vis) spec-
troscopy response and Fourier Transform Infrared (FT/IR)
Spectroscopy response, and (ii) Mechanical Properties: ma-
terial elasticity and moisture content. These material char-
acteristics were selected based on our discussions with ma-
terial science experts10.
Ultra Violet - Visible (UV-Vis) spectroscopy: The UV-Vis
response of a given material represents the absorption of
monochromatic radiations at different wavelengths (ultra-
violet (200-400 nm) to visible spectrum (400-750 nm)) by
the material. A peak in the UV-Vis response indicates that
the material has high absorbance of the light at that given
wavelength [32]. A Perkin Elmar Lambda 900 UV/Vis/NIR
spectrometer11 was used to measure the light absorbance
property of materials shown in Figure 3.
Fourier Transform Infrared (FT/IR) Spectroscopy: The
FT/IR response of a given material is a signature of its
10Material resistivity would be an important characteristic when perform-
ing a similar analysis for capacitive fingerprint readers.
11http://www.perkinelmer.com/category/uv-vis-spectroscopy-uv
molecular structure. The molecules absorb frequencies that
are characteristic of their structure, called resonant frequen-
cies, i.e. the frequency of the absorbed radiation matches
with the vibrational frequency [35]. An FT/IR signature
is a graph of infrared light absorbance (or transmittance)
on the Y-axis vs. frequency on the X-axis (measured in
reciprocal centimeters i.e. cm−1 or wave numbers). Fig-
ure 4 presents the FT/IR response of 12 different PA ma-
terials measured by Jasco FT/IR-4600 spectrometer12. The
FT/IR spectrometer provided material response in the range
250 − 6, 000 wave numbers, but all the materials exhibited
non-zero transmittance only in the range 250 − 375 wave
numbers.
Material Elasticity: A fingerprint spoof fabricated using
an elastic material undergoes higher deformation, resulting
in large friction ridge distortion when the spoof is pressed
against the fingerprint reader’s glass platen, compared to
less elastic materials. We classify the 12 different PA ma-
terials into three classes based on their observed elasticity:
(i) High elasticity: Silicone, Monster Liquid Latex, Dragon
Skin, Wood Glue, Gelatin, (ii) Medium elasticity: Play Doh,
Latex Body Paint, 3D Universal Targets, and (iii) Low elas-
ticity: 2D Paper, Gold Fingers, Transparency, and Conduc-
tive Ink on Paper.
Moisture Content: Another crucial material property is
the amount of moisture content in it which leads to varying
degrees of contrast in the corresponding fingerprint image.
PA materials with high moisture content (e.g. Silicone) pro-
duce high contrast images compared to materials with low
moisture content (e.g. 2D Paper) on CrossMatch reader.
We classify the 12 different PA materials into three classes
of moisture content level based on the observed image con-
trast: (i) High Moisture Level: Silicone, Play Doh, Dragon
Skin, (ii) Medium Moisture Level: Monster Liquid latex,
Wood Glue, Gold Fingers, Gelatin, 3D Universal Targets,
and (iii) Low Moisture Level: 2D Paper, Latex Body Paint,
Transparency, Conductive Ink on Paper.
2.6. Feature Representation of Bonafide and PAs
To explore the relationship between bonafide and differ-
ent PA materials, we train a single multi-class MobileNet-
v1 model to distinguish between 13 classes, i.e. bonafide
and 12 PA materials. The training split includes a set of
randomly selected 100 images or half the number of total
images (whichever is lower) from each of bonafide and PA
materials for a total of 1, 102 images. In a similar way, a
test split is constructed from the remaining set of images
for a total of 1, 101 images. This protocol is adopted to
reduce the bias due to unbalanced nature of the training
dataset. We extract the 1024-dimensional feature vector
from the bottleneck layer of the MobileNet-v1 network [16]
12https://jascoinc.com/products/spectroscopy/ftir-
spectrometers/models/ftir-4000-series/
Figure 5. Representation of bonafide fingerprints and presenta-
tion attack instruments fabricated with different materials in the
3D t-SNE feature space. The original representation is 1024-
dimensional obtained form the trained CNN model.
Figure 6. Average Pearson correlation values between 12 PA ma-
terials based on the material characteristics.
and project it to 3 dimensions using t-SNE approach [20]
(see Figure 5). Figures 7 (a)-(f) present the representation
of bonafide and different subsets of PA materials in 3D t-
SNE feature space from different angles selected to provide
a complete view. The Bonafide (dark green) and Silicone
(navy blue) are included in all graphs for perspective. The
3D graph is generated using plotly library and is accessible
at the link: https://plot.ly/˜icbsubmission/
0/livepa-feature-space/#/
2.7. Representative set of PA Materials
We utilize material characteristics and 3D t-SNE visual-
ization to identify a set of representative materials to train
a robust and generalized model. From the four material
characteristics, two continuous (i.e. optical characteristics)
and two categorical (i.e. mechanical characteristics), we
compute four 12 × 12 correlation matrices. For the two
Figure 7. Representation of bonafide and different subsets of PA materials in 3D t-SNE feature space from different angles selected to
provide the best view. The bonafide (dark green) and silicone (navy blue) are included in all graphs for perspective.
Figure 8. A complete-link dendrogram representing the hierarchi-
cal (agglomerative) clustering of PAs based on the shared material
characteristics.
continuous variables, we compute the Pearson correlation13
between all pairs of materials to generate two correlation
matrices Cuvvis and Cftir. For the two categorical vari-
ables, if two PA materials mi and mj belong to the same
13MATLAB’s corr function is used to compute the Pearson correlation.
https://www.mathworks.com/help/stats/corr.html
category, we assign Ci,j = 1, else Ci,j = 0, to generate
Celastic and Cmoisture. The four correlation matrices cor-
responding to each of the four individual material charac-
teristics, are averaged to generate the final correlation ma-
trix Cmaterial, such that Cmateriali,j = (C
uvvis
i,j + C
ftir
i,j +
Celastici,j +C
moisture
i,j )/4, (see Figure 6) which is utilized to
perform complete-link hierarchical (agglomerative) cluster-
ing14 of the 12 PA materials. Figure 8 shows a complete-
link dendrogram representing the hierarchical grouping of
the 12 PA materials based on Cmaterial. Based on the 3D
t-SNE visualization and the hierarchical clustering of the 12
PA materials, we observe that:
• PA materials Silicone, Play Doh, Gelatin, and 2D
Printed Paper are closest to Live fingerprints in the 3D
t-SNE feature space compared to other materials. This
explains why excluding any one of them resulted in
poor generalization performance when tested against
them. These PA materials appear in different clusters
in the dendrogram (see Figures 7 (a) and 8).
• PA material Dragon Skin is easily detected when Sil-
icone is included in training as silicone lies between
bonafide and Dragon Skin (see Figures 7 (b) and (d)).
These materials also lie in the same cluster indicating
shared material characteristics.
14We utilize MATLAB’s linkage and dendrogram functions with parame-
ters method=‘complete’ and metric=‘correlation’.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 9. Minutiae clustering. (a) fingerprint image; (b) extracted minutiae overlaid on (a); (c) 96× 96 patches centered at each minutiae;
(d) minutiae clustering using k-means (k is set to 10 here)
• PA material Transparency is easily distinguishable
when 2D Printed Paper is included in training. In the
t-SNE visualization, we observe that 2D Printed Pa-
per forms two clusters, where one of the clusters is co-
located with transparency (see Figures 7 (a) and (e)).
• PA materials Wood Glue and Gelatin are co-located in
feature space assisting each other if included in train-
ing (see Figure 7 (c)), but Gelatin is closer to Bonafide
which explains its worse performance compared to
Wood Glue. These materials also form a second level
cluster in the dendrogram.
• PA material Latex Body Paint lies between Bonafide
and Conductive Ink on Paper, and PA material Monster
Liquid Latex lies between Bonafide and 3D Universal
Targets in 3D t-SNE visualization which could explain
the high detection for Conductive Ink on Paper and 3D
Universal Targets (see Figure 7 (f)). However, these
materials do not form a cluster until the last agglomer-
ation step, indicating possibility of other material char-
acteristics that could be further explored.
Based on these observations, we infer that a set of 6 PA
materials, namely Silicone, 2D Paper, Play Doh, Gelatin,
Latex Body Paint, and Monster Liquid Latex, almost cov-
ers the entire feature space around Bonafide (see Figure 7).
A model trained using bonafide and these 6 PA materials
achieved an average TDR = 89.76% ± 6.97% @ FDR
= 0.2% when tested on each of the remaining 6 materi-
als. This performance is comparable to the average TDR
= 90.97% ± 7.27% @ FDR = 0.2% when 11 PA materi-
als are used for training, indicating no significant contribu-
tion provided by including the other 5 materials in training.
We posit that the PAD performance against new materials
can be estimated by analyzing its material characteristics
instead of collecting large datasets for each of the new ma-
terial. To address the second limitation of high resource
requirement of CNN based PAD approach, we propose op-
timizations to Fingerprint Spoof Buster in the next section.
3. Fingerprint Spoof Buster Lite
The Fingerprint Spoof Buster [6] evaluates all local
patches corresponding to the detected minutiae. The in-
dividual scores output by the CNN model for patch is av-
eraged to produce a global spoofness score. The time re-
quired to evaluate a single patch utilizing MobileNet-v1
CNN model on a commodity smartphone, such as Redmi
Note 415 (Qualcomm Snapdragon 625 64-bit Octa Core
2GHz Processor and 3GB RAM), is around 125ms. This re-
sults in an average execution time of 4.3 seconds per image
(with an average no. of 35 minutiae/image). Moreover, a
MobileNet-v1 trained model in ProtoBuf (.pb) format takes
around 13MB. In order to reduce the memory and compu-
tation requirements for real-time operation on a commodity
smartphone, we propose the following two optimizations:
Model Quantization: Tensorflow-lite16 is used to convert
the MobileNet-v1 (.pb) model to tflite format, resulting in
a light-weight and low-latency model with weights quan-
tized to perform byte computations instead of float airth-
metic. The resultant model size is only 3.2MB and can ex-
ecute PAD for a single patch on the same Redmi Note 4
smartphone in around 30ms, approximately 80% reduction
in computation and memory requirements.
Reduce the number of patches: It has been observed that
minutiae points in a fingerprint image are distributed in a
non-uniform manner [31]. This obviates the need for eval-
uating all minutiae-centered patches. We cluster the minu-
tiae using K-means clustering (see Figure 9 (d)), and then
extract a single patch (96 × 96) centered at the centroid of
each cluster. A weight is assigned to the centroid based lo-
cal patch corresponding to the number of minutiae belong-
15https://www.gsmarena.com/xiaomi redmi note 4-8531.php
16https://www.tensorflow.org/lite/
Figure 10. User interface of the Android application, Fingerprint Spoof Buster Lite shown in (a). It allows selection of inference model as
shown in (b). User can load a fingerprint image from phone storage or capture a live scan from a fingerprint reader as shown in (c). The
app executes PAD and displays the final decision along with highlighted local patches on the screen shown in (d) and (e).
Table 2. Detection time and PAD performance (TDR @ FDR =
0.2%) of Fingerprint Spoof Buster Lite.
# Minutiae
Clusters
Time Required (in ms)
(Avg. ± s.d.)
TDR (%) @
FDR = 0.2%
5 148± 19 93.9± 1.1
10 302± 15 95.3± 0.5
15 447± 13 95.3± 0.5
20 607± 9 95.3± 0.6
25 736± 21 95.7± 0.5
30 910± 18 95.7± 0.4
All Minutiae
(avg. = 35)
1554± 11 95.7± 0.1
Note: RedMi Note 4 smartphone (Qualcomm Snapdragon 625 64-bit
Octa Core 2GHz Processor and 3GB RAM) costs $150.
ing to that cluster. The final spoofness score is a weighted
average of centroid-based local patches.
Apart from the above two optimizations, we modify the
MobileNet-v1 network such that the input image size is
96 × 96, same as the patch size. Correspondingly, the ker-
nel size used in the last average pool layer is reduced from
7 × 7 to 3 × 3. This reduces the time required to train the
network on a dataset with around 100, 000 patches from 6-8
hours to 2-2.5 hours using a single NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti
GPU, without any drop in PAD performance. We utilized
the tensorflow-slim library17 for our experiments.
Table 2 presents the accuracy of Fingerprint Spoof
Buster Lite (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%) and the average time
required to evaluate minutiae-based patches on Redmi Note
4. Since k-means clustering depends on the cluster initial-
ization, we use 5-fold cross-validation and report average±
std for both the evaluation time and PAD performance. Ta-
17https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/slim
ble 2 also shows that no more than 10 minutiae clusters are
needed to maintain PAD performance, while reducing the
computational requirement by almost 80%.
Given this reduction in resource requirements, an
Android-based application (app) for Fingerprint Spoof
Buster, called Fingerpint Spoof Buster Lite was developed.
The app provides an option to select an inference model
trained on images from different fingerprint readers such as
CrossMatch, SilkID18, etc. as shown in Figure 10 (b). The
app can evaluate a fingerprint image input by a fingerprint
reader connected to the mobile phone via OTG cable. It
also allows loading and evaluating an image from the phone
storage/gallery (see Figure 10 (c)). The app displays the
captured image, with extracted fingerprint minutiae over-
laid on the fingerprint image. The golden circles represent
the minutiae clusters. Local patches centered around the
centroid of minutiae clusters are evaluated and highlighted
based on the spoofness score. After evaluation, the app
presents the final decision (Live / Spoof), spoofness score,
and PA detection time (see Figures 10 (d) and (e)).
4. Conclusions
CNN based state-of-the-art PAD approaches suffer from
two major limitations: (i) generalization against materi-
als not seen during training, and (ii) high computation and
memory requirements for execution. In this study, we have
evaluated the generalization performance of a state-of-the-
art PAD approach, namely Fingerprint Spoof Buster, using
12 different PA materials. We investigate a clustering of
PA materials based on four material characteristics (two op-
tical and two mechanical) and 3D t-SNE visualization, to
explain the performance of cross-material experiments. We
conclude that a subset of PA materials, namely Silicone, 2D
18http://www.silkid.com/products/
Paper, Play Doh, Gelatin, Latex Body Paint, and Monster
Liquid Latex are essential for training a robust PAD. Ad-
ditionally, we proposed two optimizations to the state-of-
the-art PAD and implemented an Android app solution that
can run on a commodity smartphone (Xiaomi Redmi Note
4) without significant drop in performance and make a PA
detection in real-time.
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